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Epistemology Revisited: A Feminist Critique 
 




The Platonic legacy of Western epistemology has been severely attacked for its dominant 
exclusivist and coercive rationality in the discourses of anti-foundationalism and anti-
representationalism, which have also given rise to several alternative epistemologies. The feminist 
discourse challenges the exclusivist and appropriationist logic of Western epistemology, or 
science, for being highly gender-biased and oppressive. Weininger’s remark that ‘No woman is 
really interested in science, she may deceive herself and many good men, but bad psychologists, 
by thinking so’2 is one of such silencing masculine diktats that have deeper roots in the sexist, 
racist and classist biases. The feminists’ revolts against the power/knowledge dynamics and 
subsequent epistemological directions emerge from a reflexive undertaking into the nature and 
production of knowledge.  The paper examines the objectivity debates within the feminist science 
circles in this regard and explores the space between the oppressive dichotomies of nature/culture, 
core/peripheral, absolute/historical to articulate an alternative epistemology in the feminists’ larger 
political program of social justice. 
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Non-homogeneous and fractured to the core, feminism, a political ideology, harbors 
tensions and some circularity in its beliefs in which we can find the reasons for a vehement 
opposition against western epistemology and also a methodological defense to its own critique. As 
a methodology, it ruptures the dominant conceptual fabric and unearths biased perspectives. In 
terming the male-dominated biological conception of the sex/gender dichotomy and other claims 
about the cognitive incapability of women for science and rational judgment mere social 
constructs, a feminist critique finds a solid argumentative force. But the notions of objectivity and 
truth meet no such criticisms though they are equally socially constructed. In a similar vein, 
demanding that women’s ways of knowing is cognitively different and contesting a proclamation 
that knowledge and science are gender-neutral are incongruous in nature. Similarly, in defending 
the individual knower in the complex web of her embodied experiences and saying that ‘who 
knows is the community, not the individual’3 are paradoxical beliefs. It is within this web of 
inconsistent ideas that we can extrapolate the dimensions of feminist epistemology and efforts to 
                                                             
1 Anupam Yadav is Assistant Professor in the Department of Humanities & Social Sciences at Birla Institute of 
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make various beliefs consistent. Bringing conflicts and biases into a realm of communicative-
praxis, a rational and critical dialogue for better human conditions marks the general spirit of 
feminist discourse. If social justice is a political goal, transcendence and search for any absolute, 
redemptive truth is no answer. As Haraway remarks, ‘feminists don’t need a doctrine of objectivity 
that promises transcendence.’4 Feminism raises the question of epistemic injustice and hence 
inquiries into epistemology that is fraught with the ethical-political. In what follows, the paper 
discusses feminist critique of western epistemology with respect to the objectivity debates which 
paves a way to articulate an alternative program of epistemology. 
 
 
Western Epistemology vs. Feminist Standpoints 
Grounded in the Platonic ideational/doxactic dichotomy, the western epistemology,  
continues the rational/irrational, ideational/sensible divide in the Cartesian search for the ultimate 
foundation, the epistemic certainty devoid of all pretensions and doubts in the self’s immediacy 
and enclosure, to the cognitive essentialism in the Kantian transcendentalism. The language of 
bivalence, the rational/irrational, necessary/contingent, stable/precarious, core/peripheral, 
harnessed in the master/slave mentality, exhibits itself predominantly in the scientific-
technological disembodied gazing and the desire to control everything. Epistemology shows 
tremendous faith in the cognitive abilities of men to know and master everything. Though the 
Platonic rationalism places self-mastery, a rational and just philosophical vision, within the 
cosmic-moral ordering of things, modern Enlightenment liberates humans to be the Lockean 
neutral-punctual selves5 asserting their absolute freedom in making their individual rational 
choices. The cognitively sealed subject is assertive of cognitive essentialism which results into an 
all-powerful controlling will to represent and recast the world accordingly, and make it 
technologically subservient. Science, with a strong commitment to discard every knowledge-claim 
that is unverifiable and, in tandem with the mathematical certitude, has made this coercive 
rationality a reality and is being blamed for committing an epistemic injustice. 
A very pertinent way of examining feminist attack on the western epistemology, or 
alternately, science could be the question of objectivity in the feminist science circles. There is a 
massive discussion on whether there should be a separate feminist science, as opposed to the 
oppressive, masculinist hegemony, and a unique research program that speaks of the distinct 
feminist science. Keller, Haraway, Harding and others, in this regard, say that their voice is not a 
struggle for an exclusive feminist science and a specific research method, rather; for an alternative 
understanding - a viable possibility to do science which is consistent with the feminist 
commitments, values and emancipatory projects for women’s social position. As Keller has put it, 
an approach that makes ‘difference in science’ rather than a ‘different science’.6 Haraway concedes 
that “Immortality and omnipotence are not our goals”.7 A distinctive feminist method, Harding 
says, “is misguided and should be abandoned”.8  
                                                             
4 Haraway, Donna (1988), “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspectives” in Feminist Studies, Vol.14, No. 3, pp. 575-599. 
5 See Taylor, Charles (1989), Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Harvard University Press.  
6 Keller, Evelyn Fox (1987), “The Gender/Science System: or, Is Sex to Gender As Nature Is To Science?” in 
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Vol. 2, No.3 pp. 36-49. 
7 Haraway, Donna (1988), “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspectives” in Feminist Studies, Vol.14, No. 3, p. 580. 
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Many feminists challenge this positivistic arrogance of terminating every non-science as 
nonsense by examining the socio-communal production of knowledge itself. The feminist 
undertaking here is ‘reflexive’, as Bruno Latour uses this idea ‘to denote any text that takes into 
account its own production’.9 The critical analyses of knowledge-questions woven in the social 
fabric reveal how gender hierarchies, linked with other social axes like race, class, sexuality, 
nation, culture and age constitute the idea of epistemic authority and are responsible for the history 
of subjugation. The exclusion of women and their experiential phenomena from the program of 
knowledge-production is a result of the social-political dynamics embedded in the Western 
logocentric epistemology. Central to the power-knowledge nexus is the reason-centricity of the 
male, white, Euro-American community. Against this Cogito-centric pole of autonomous knowers, 
the feminists demand a shift to the communicative-‘we’ pole of the ‘effective-historical-
consciousness’, to use Gadamer’s phrase. Nelson argues that ‘you or I can only know what we 
know (or could know)’.10 The self is in relation with others and the knower is also an actor, an 
experienced, and engaged person in the historically situated contingencies. From this marked, 
embodied position the notions of objectivity and truth lose their neutrality and human cognitive 
apparatus no longer remains confined to the detached scientific rationality. 
Haraway reconstructs the idea of objectivity as situated or positioned knowledge. To her, 
“feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges”.11 Her social constructionist stand 
is not about making science perspectival and it is also not entangled in the bias vs. objectivity, 
science vs. pseudo-science debate. It is about unearthing the politics of positioning, science 
situating itself at the apex of the hierarchy of all knowledge-claims, claiming a God’s eye-view, 
an unaccountable, disembodied gazing. Haraway chooses the metaphor of ‘vision’ to unmask the 
politics of gazing and proposes a better account of objectivity, or science, or a conception of the 
world. Vision, she argues, is embodied. But, science asserts its power-rhetoric by turning vision 
into gazing, a leap out of the marked body, a gazing ‘that makes the unmarked category claim the 
power to see and not to be seen, to represent while escaping representation… the unmarked 
positions of Man and White…”.12 Science with technologically produced instruments enhances 
our visual possibilities, penetrating and over-arching vision to see far and wide. The supremacy of 
science, a vision from everywhere is a political position of unfettered control and power. Haraway 
calls this optics an illusion, a god trick, a politics of gazing and remaining elusive.  It’s a false 
promise, an unaccountable imagery, a myth in the rhetoric of science. We need to be disillusioned 
from this science imagery and its tricks and ‘need to learn in our bodies, endowed with primate 
color and stereoscopic vision’.13 This learning of the situated vision, Haraway says, ‘allows us to 
become answerable for what we learn how to see’. 14 
The situated objectivity is a critical evaluation of how meanings and bodies are formed, a 
story that does not lose track of its mediation, knowing the process of what we learn how to see 
and where we stand in physical and mental space. It is a knowledge that does not work on the mind 
/body split; rather, sustains with other positions for a larger and transformative account of the 
world. It is a hermeneutical stance of articulating one’s vision, ways of knowing the world, taking 
                                                             
9 Latour, Bruno (1988), “The Politics of Explanation: An Alternative” in Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers 
in the Sociology of Knowledge, Steve Woolgar (ed.), Sage, p. 166. 
10 Nelson, Lynn Harkinson (1993), “Epistemological Communities” in Feminist Epistemologies, Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Routledge: New York & London, p. 124. 
11 Haraway (1988), p.581. 
12 Ibid., p. 581. 
13 Ibid., p. 582. 
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interest in one’s own and others’ positions, connecting and building meanings rather than denying 
them. A larger vision, a better objective account of the world is possible because ‘subjectivity is 
multidimensional’. Haraway remarks, “the knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, 
whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and 
therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. Here is the 
perfect promise of objectivity…”15 
The seeing from below, from the subjugated view-points is privileged as it is an encounter 
with how meanings are written or rather denied and repressed. But, this is also not unproblematic; 
for, the web of conversations here resonates with multiplicities, distortions, and repressions. 
Nonetheless, turning our vision to this open field of human semiotics resists splits, dichotomies 
and transcendence, an unmarked position of the master, one God from which, Haraway argues, the 
objectivity is not possible. The situated objectivity, making knowledge-claims from one’s own 
position and assimilating others’ positions, is a mediated self-understanding which is not hostile 
to contestations, deconstructions, webbed connection, a vision that is not fixed but usable. The 
visual metaphor, in this context, allows us to see limitlessly, beyond fixed appearances, and into 
the making of the visual production. The epistemology of location, the partial view, resists closure, 
finality and, as Haraway puts it, ‘simplification in the last instance’.16 Scientific objectivity desires 
total single vision, the self-identity, a God’s position but Haraway argues that subjectivity is shot 
through with historicity and hence being in all positions is an impossibility. The feminist 
objectivity, in the Popperian sense of scientific rationality, is an ongoing critical and rational 
engagement with the human conditions for better visions, better accounts of the world which have 
no escape from human agency and responsibility. 
Haraway writes: 
 
“Situated knowledges are about communities, not about isolated individuals. The 
only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular. The science 
question in feminism is about objectivity as positioned rationality. Its images are 
not the products of escape and transcendence of limits (the view from above) but 
joining of partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that 
promises a vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within 
limits and contradictions – of views from somewhere”.17  
 
The idea of positioning, the embodied objectivity in the feminist fabric makes 
epistemology interpretive, multifarious and perspectival which makes it amenable to the risk of 
unpalatable relativism. But, an embodied vision, Haraway argues, is not a relativistic position; 
instead, it is a partial position. It is also an accountable position; for, relocating one’s position 
demands justification. From this standpoint, homogenization is an unaccountable position. 
Haraway rejects relativism as she rejects totalitarianism or absolutism. To her, both are views from 
nowhere and everywhere, illusions to have self-enclosed vision, holding no responsibility. The 
positioned objectivity between the two is a space filled with resonances and multiplicities, the 
epistemological field that not only makes us understand the ways of knowing, ways of positioning, 
the semiotics of meaning and bodies but also makes us accountable for them. It is a larger vision 
to understand ourselves better in power-politics, gaining access to agency and resources, thus, 
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getting a chance to live better. So, it is only in partial positions (that defies encroaching others’ 
positions) that the rational and objective inquiry sustain and ‘have a chance for life’.18 
 Just as Haraway unmasks the biased ‘vision’ in the scientific account of objectivity, 
Lorraine Code unearths deeply rooted biases in the ‘S-knows-that-p’ mainstream epistemologies 
of positivist-empiricist nature that have dominated and controlled the nature and production of 
knowledge. They “are the artifacts of a small, privileged group of educated, usually prosperous, 
white men … ideal objectivity is a generalization from the subjectivity of quite a small group, 
albeit a group that has the power, security, and prestige to believe that it can generalize its 
experiences and normative ideals across the social order, thus producing a group of like-minded 
practitioners (“we”) and dismissing “others” as deviant, aberrant (“they”), argues Code.19 The 
propositional formula ‘S-knows-that-p’, under certain necessary and sufficient conditions, stands 
for a formal, distanced, dislocated, objective and value-neutral positivistic credo that presupposes 
the homogeneous human nature. The positivistic legacy encompasses the human-social sciences 
and wishes them to model themselves in the scientific rhetoric of quantifying ‘data’ and presenting 
reliable empirical results which the scientific community approves of. Both S and p are the place 
holders replaceable or substitutable for any knower and the known respectively in this scheme. 
This universalizing tendency of the Enlightenment liberal humanism, Code argues, essentializes 
or reduces the human subject/knower to ‘surrogate knowers’, a term she borrows from Naomi 
Scheman. 
The politics of substitutability exorcises the individual knower from his or her historical 
circumstances and interests involved in the epistemic relation with the world. The positivistic 
purging of the context of discovery by the explanatory and justificatory standards for pure 
neutrality is exclusionary of the attributes and experiences of femaleness and often other so-called 
denigrated features like emotions, sensitivity and practicality.  This standard epistemology, 
according to Code, is responsible for the knowledge production of the autonomous, dislocated 
reasoners who turn women and ‘others’ into interchangeable observable variables. The neutrality 
of epistemic agency in the fact-finding exercise and at the face value of “Science has proved…”, 
at the same time, liberates it from responsibility toward the intellectual health of the community. 
The ideals of objectivity, truth, exact representation rest on the bias that ‘if one cannot transcend 
subjectivity and the particularities of its “location”, then there is no knowledge worth analyzing’.20 
Against this, the feminists in general, argue that the subjectivity of the inquirer is an integral part 
of any inquiry. Code retorts, ‘objectivity requires taking subjectivity into account’.21 
Code here intervenes that this paradigmatic model of detached observation is a failure, for 
example, in the case of a child’s process of ‘knowing others’ which significantly affects his/her 
cognitive development. The knowledge of the other person, besides the known facts, transcends 
any such cognitive model. It is rather a continuous learning, positioning and responding in relation 
to the other. This interpretive engagement, though susceptible to skepticism, demolishes the model 
of reducing everything to the neutrality of observable simples and asserts that the human cognitive 
enterprise is more complex than the apparatus of propositional formula. 
Feminist epistemology as a critique unearths the political dynamics involved in the 
production of knowledge and challenges the supremacy of scientific detached neutrality. The 
                                                             
18 Ibid., p. 580. 
19 Code, Lorraine (1993), “Taking Subjectivity into Account” in Feminist Epistemologies, Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Routledge: New York & London, pp. 21-22. 
20 Ibid. p. 16. 
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language of hierarchy, the metaphor of vision, the view from nowhere, the rhetoric that ‘Science 
has proved...’, the formulaic ‘S-knows-that-p’ are entangled in power/knowledge nexus and put 
limits to human cognition. To unfold the nexus is to question the perspectiveless position of 
epistemology that invests epistemic authority in the hands of few, the male, white, the capitalists, 
the scientists – the elite knowers who have the capital and resources. The knowledge-production 
thus goes into the arena that delinks the political with the ethical. The sites of the marginalized, 
the peripheral are the locations that the feminists thinkers choose to revisit epistemology. Speaking 
from the periphery presupposes the binary of absolutism and relativism, but feminist epistemology 
goes beyond and finds the vocabulary of integration, collaboration more useful. There are sincere 
efforts to evolve pedagogies that claim much richer understanding of the world not by discarding 
the opposites, the diagonals but by putting them together dialectically. In the following section, 




Overcoming Binaries, Dialectic Mediation and Interdisciplinarity 
Redefining the geography of the epistemic terrain, in the feminist circles, takes a social 
constructionist position but suffers the risk of relativism.  A relativist position is precarious as it 
fails to address the libertarian program of feminism. One cautious safeguard, in this regard, has 
been to draw on the ethical-political underpinnings of different epistemic positions. Haraway 
particularly argues that both relativism and absolutism are non-accountable political positions from 
everywhere and nowhere, but situated objectivity is an accountable, larger vision conjoining partial 
views, though imperfectly. Similarly, when Code argues that the politics of substitutability 
homogenizes all knowledge-possibilities, she draws our attention to the matter of accountability 
toward the intellectual health of the society. 
On a different front, Linda Alcoff argues how the conception of ontological reality governs 
the epistemological theories and refutes the belief that the absence of value neutrality is tantamount 
to radical relativism. She defends her position from the risk of slipping into political frame, as has 
been feared by Keller (for not believing in the positivistic standards), by advocating a constructivist 
account of truth, a matter of our perception of the social reality or how truth emerges from the 
social reality. While comparing the two models of a theory-choice in the field of feminist social 
science, namely, the holistic model (inspired by Peirce and Quine’s pragmatism), and 
constructivist model (by Gadamer and Foucault’s idea of the undeniability of prejudices or 
discourse as producer of knowledge), she argues that both rely on the principle of coherence which 
functions separately in two cases. While the holistic model takes into account the transcendental 
reality and talks about adjusting the beliefs within, the constructivist model observes no such 
independent reality. The truth is a product, a construct of the social processes. The constructivist 
approach to truth, Alcoff says, ‘is not just the criterion of truth that is relative, but truth itself that 
is relative’.22 That is, our beliefs do not become ‘less true’ in failing to correspond with some 
absolute, independent, static reality. ‘What is sacrificed by the Constructivist conception is not 
against the objectivity but merely universalizability’.23 
A general line of argument that emerges in the feminist discourse of epistemology is to 
question the unwarranted sanctity of the language of scientism, the unexamined assumption that 
                                                             
22 Alcoff, Linda (1987) “Justifying Feminist Social Science” in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Vol. 2, 
No.3 pp. 107-128. 
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science and politics should not be seen together. It is rather the underlying politics of gazing in the 
unmarked, transcended self-enclosed vision that feminism strongly reacts to. The homogenization 
of knowledge-centres through the language of reduction, translation, substitutability in the name 
of objectivity is to play the politics of subjugation, radicalizing relativism and hence denying truth. 
The feminist question of epistemology is to find newer grounds for reconstructing epistemology 
within the space between the dichotomies of objectivism and relativism. The feminist stance is to 
turn to this discarded, alienating, marginalized space, marred with ruptures, that lacks clear 
binaries or diagonals to operate on. Turning to this space is not evading and escaping the nuanced 
reality for a desire for some ‘redemptive truths’ that science or philosophy, for example, may offer.  
The locus of webbed relations with inherent complexities, multiplicities, hiatuses denies any 
meaning in simplification and closure. What makes this a meaningful site for an alternative 
epistemology is the possibility of dialogue, negotiations rather than overcoming the conflicts with 
some overarching, unified theory. Epistemology from the subjugated position questions the 
language of disjuncture and binaries of more privileged and less privileged discourses and attempt 
to bring them into a sustainable mediation. 
While talking about the heterogeneity within epistemology and its reconstruction on newer 
grounds, Alcoff and Potter point out how Philosophy itself must bring its privileged abstractness 
closer to the fluid applied discourses like ethics. Such a reconstruction, they argue, “promises to 
reconfigure the borders between epistemology, political philosophy, ethics and other areas of 
philosophy as come to see interrelationships and inseparability of heretofore disparate issues. 
Moreover, the distinction between margin and center or periphery and core within the domain of 
philosophy itself give way. Once we recognize that values, politics, and knowledge are 
intrinsically connected, the hierarchies and divisions within philosophy will be replaced by more 
holistic and coherentist models.”24 Against the androcentric, totalitalitarian vocabulary of 
asymmetries and the rigidity of the disciplinary boundaries, the feminist viewpoint is to explore 
the space between them as a rich epistemic field with diverse cognitive abilities and competencies 
and a possible mediation, an interdisciplinary discourse. Gilligan, in the context of moral 
reasoning, talks about conjoining the rather antithetical perspectives of inequality and 
abandonment as two grounds of ethical decision-making. To her, they cut across all human 
relations and not antithetical in the sense that ‘justice uncaring and caring unjust’. They are 
cohesive as matters of morality are grounded in the interwoven complex relations of the self and 
others.25 
Another useful site for seeing things across boundaries is to analyze the androcentric, 
technoscientifc developments in the fields of genetic engineering (GE) and agricultural 
biotechnology. The feminist activism against GE for its impact on environment, women and the 
Third World is driven by a constructive approach to bring together the issues of women, 
environmental protection and social justice together. This requires mitigating rigid boundaries 
between humans and nonhumans and explore ‘how ecological and social transformations can be 
geared towards a sustainable society’.26 The idea of ecological rationality or ecological democracy 
thrusts upon the right vision to redefine human rationality in constructive rather than in the divisive 
                                                             
24 Alcoff & Potter (eds.) (1993), “Introduction: When Feminism Intersect Epistemology” in Feminist 
Epistemologies, Routledge: New York & London, pp. 1-14. 
25 See Gilligan, Carol (1982), In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Harvard 
University Press. 
26 Kurian, Priya A. & Munshi, Debashish (2006) “Negotiating Human-Nature Boundaries, Cultural Hierarchies and 
Masculinist Paradigms of Development Studies” in Feminist Futures: Re-imagining Women, Culture and 
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manner, in the direction of sustenance rather than control and hence talks about aligning the 
overwhelming dominance of the technoscientific discourse with the local common sense and 
affective wisdom.  Kurian and Munshi argue that ‘a recognition of partial perspectives on all sides, 
across all actors, is ultimately what could allow concerns for ecological rationality, social justice 
and science to come together in meaningful ways. Thus, instead of the polarized discourses of 
technoscientific expertise and public skepticism, an acknowledgement of partial perspectives may 
give rise to a hybridized discourse where scientific analysis aligns with local, indigenous and 
popular knowledge with a central focus on ecological and social rationality’.27 The idea of 
ecological rationality is a practical approach to sustain in relation to others where the ‘other’ is 
granted the agential role rather than erased in the homogenization. The idea of hybridized discourse 
is a novel epistemic position that emerges from the feminist thinking of social justice.  
In another important context of antiglobalization, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2006) 
unearths the power-knowledge nexus in White feminist scholarship and evolves a pedagogy that 
rests on the idea of simultaneous existence of what is territorially antithetical as the global and the 
local. Mohanty’s idea of feminist solidarity stresses on a pedagogy to work out the ‘common 
differences’ through the cross-cultural specificities and sharing of women’s experiences of power 
and struggle which, she argues, is not tantamount to postmodern relativism. Her strategy is to 
exploit the most suitable binary of one-third/two-thirds world to develop a comparative feminist 
studies model which ‘allows for teaching and learning about points of connection and distance 
among and between communities of women marginalized and privileged along numerous local 
and global dimensions’.28 This curricular strategy allows learning ‘the complexities, singularities, 
and interconnections between communities of women such that power, privilege, agency, and 
dissent can be made visible and engaged with.’29 The feminist solidarity program, beyond the 
territorial polarity created between the local and global, thus revisits the epistemic privilege of the 





Situational knowledges, the marginalized locations are the sites from which feminists voice 
the culture of dissent against the assimilation of differences. Subverting the politics of binarisms 
becomes the centre stage for these critiques without compromising the feminist objective of social 
solidarity and just democratic conditions. The epistemic stance of making meaning from the web 
of socially excluded particularities and injustices unfolds the narrowness in the ideals of objectivity 
and propositional closure. The epistemology, enriched in the space of dialectic mediation of 
binaries, overthrows the artificiality of boundaries and enables us to see the ‘common differences’ 
for a better and larger understanding of the world. The epistemology revisited in the feminist 
discourse is reflexive, creative and phronetic toward the sustainable account of the world. This 
paper has explicated how feminist discourse demolishes the language of hierarchy and examined 
the relationality of the hitherto disparate epistemic positions for an enriched epistemology toward 
social justice.  
 
                                                             
27 Ibid., p. 156. 
28 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (2006), Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, 
Zubaan, p. 243. 
29 Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
